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Corporatism, Participation and Society 
Malcolm Warner 
After having located industrial democracy within the broader 
debate on corporatism, the author examines the attempts made to 
institutionalize developments of industrial democracy. 
To pin-point the chain of events which has led to developments in 
worker participation going hand in hand with a trend toward corporatism, 
we need to first look at the dynamics of their mutual interaction. As Poole 
(1975) writing on corporatism points out: 
"The history of industrial relations during the post-war period in 
Western Europe, ..., has reflected the development of a System of values in 
which économie growth has tended to beeome not only a principal aim of 
working people but also a basis of legitimacy of government itself. This in 
turn has fostered a progressive, conflicting but equally a parallel develop-
ment of both bureaucratie and démocratie currents. The désire for an im-
proved standard of living by the members of labour movements has helped 
to foster the continuing increase in the rôle of the state in the management 
of the gênerai economy and for attention being paid to labour productivity 
and industrial efficiency among a progressively more bureaucratie 
managerial and administrative personnel. But accompanying thèse trends 
has been, too, the growing power of indigenous labour movements. This 
has facilitated the parallel pursuit of workers' participation and control 
stratégies by the membership; a development partly brought about by struc-
tural movements, partly by émergent values, but also partly by the désire 
for control being rooted in the nature of labour movements themselves. But 
ironically, ..., there hâve been further attempts to institutionalize 
developments of industrial democracy in an increasingly systematic and, in-
deed, bureaucratie fashion." (Poole, 1975: 339.) 
* WARNER, Malcolm, Professor and Research Co-ordinator, Joint Graduate Pro-
gramme, The Management Collège, Henley; and Brunel University. 
** This paper is based on part of a study carried out at the request of the Commission of 
the European Communities which was part of a research project into the participation of 
workers and their représentatives in undertakings in the détermination of working conditions 
and work organization in the Member States of the Community and Sweden — A final report 
will shortly be prepared, and will be published by the Commission on completion. 
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This paper will argue issue with this latter statement in so far as such at-
tempts to systematize hâve, as yet, proved less than successful. But first, 
however, we hâve to locate industrial democracy (as a catch-ail term) within 
the broader debate on corporatism. Can it be seen as a 'logical' extension of 
attempts to bring about a greater degree of order at plant and company level 
over work-organization and manpower-deployment? As the term 'cor-
poratism' has indeed been mooted hère (see for example Crouch and Piz-
zorno, 1977; Crouch, 1979), this paper tries to ask if 'participation' is its 
mirror-image at the micro-level. 
Worker participation can of course be seen as part of a post-war trend 
in industrial relations towards formalization of collective bargaining (cf. 
Sorge & Warner, 1980). To be sure, the post-war years saw more formalized 
plant-wide pay agreements (Clegg, 1979: 445), and later thèse took on a 
company-wide format, as successive governments advanced and retreated 
on the incomes-policy front (cf. Brown, 1978). 
Taking a bird's-eye view, the classic British industrial relations view 
has often seen participation as synonymous with collective bargaining. As 
Clegg (1979: 151) puts it: "Taken literally, it (participation) might be held 
to include the whole of collective bargaining...". The reason for this is that 
bargaining "gives employée représentatives a share in managerial 
décisions" (1979: 151). It might, again, more specifically be used for exten-
sions to the bargaining process. We may well view thèse trends as part of the 
move towards greater 'professionalisation' of workplace relations (see 
Brown, 1978; Hawkins, 1978). Indeed, as Hyman (1979: 7) suggests:- "Any 
serious moves towards 'participation' (whether by législation or through in-
corporationist stratégies by major companies) are likely to extend such 
developments further. ' ' 
But is this merely a search for greater professionalisation for its own 
sake? A dynamic enterpretation is again suggested by Poole (1975) who 
believes that: "collective tendences are undoubtedly encouraged by the 
growth of large-scale enterprises and technological opérations. This is first 
because managements may increasingly seek paternalistic practices in order 
to avoid damaging conflicts with spécifie segments of workers, and second, 
on account of the fact that union organization is facilitated by the growth in 
scale and complexity of modem industrial tasks. It may also be, as 
Durkheim hinted, that such collectivist trends in the long run encourage the 
émergence of a comparatively egalitarian ethos, or at least, in the élévation 
of the principle of justice to a much higher level than obtained previously." 
(Poole, 1975: 347.) 
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It would be an easier task to link thèse tendencies if indeed there were a 
symmetrical relationship; but is this the case? In order to décide this, we 
hâve to look at the back-drop of industrial relations in Britain, 'bargained 
corporatisme at the macro-level (see Crouch, 1979), and its impact on the 
workplace. Crouch characterizes this as involving: "acceptance by unions 
of several stratégies which, compared with libéral collectivism (free collec-
tive bargaining), constitute a set-back for (workers') interests. But it also 
holds out the chance of advances. Unions are tempted — and frightened — 
by corporatist developments to sacrifice some of their entrenched but nar-
row and unambitious achievements in exchange for the possibility of greater 
political influence and more and broader power for their members in the 
work-place, but at the same time to accept more restraint, a more obvious 
rôle for the unions in restraining their members, more state interférence and 
fuller acceptance of the industrial order and its priorities." (Crouch, 1979: 
189.) 
THE GENERAL BACKGROUND 
Degrees of worker-influence in the co-determination of working condi-
tions in British firms can only be comprehended vis-à-vis this wider 
background. It is quite clear from any of the gênerai descriptions of this 
System (for example, Clegg, 1979; IDE, 1981 b.) that it is rather différent 
from its other European counter-parts. The law plays a limited part in the 
way in which British industrial relations in gênerai operate, and how 
worker-influence in spécifie areas has expanded in the context of 'bargained 
corporatism'. Not only must we look for para-legal areas of influence, but 
we must also take into account the distinction between the formai and the 
informai Systems of industrial relations (Donovan Report, 1968). 
This is not to say that the law is absent from British industrial relations, 
but that its rôle is bounded (see for example, Warner, 1981); and further 
reforms of industrial relations law are now being discussed, especially with 
respect to secondary picketing and union immunities. 
Looking beyond purely légal requirements, we must take into account 
at least three stages of influence in the system. First, actual "joint régula-
tion"; second, ongoing "tactical incursion" into managerial perogative; 
third, potential "stratégie extension" of bargained or otherwise sanctioned 
involvement. There are many issues in which workers hâve a say under the 
présent status quo, although thèse vary from one spécifie context to 
another. There is, however, a common pattern in which many issues are 
jointly regulated through collective bargaining, although thèse are not 
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necessarily always written down. There is a core-area regarding wages and 
conditions which tends to be more formalized than other areas such as those 
involving work practices. There is rather more than would meet the super-
ficial glance hère, and in many ways British workers can be said to hâve 
considerably increased their influence — either directly or indirectly in this 
way. Beyond this, there seem to be a number of areas where further incur-
sions into managerial prérogatives concerning shop-floor décisions hâve 
taken place or are potentially capable of doing so. Indeed, advances hâve 
been made in such areas as working conditions, safety, and so on. It is in the 
wider areas of influence where one might be likely to see a possible stratégie 
extension of worker-influence, although this has not to date corne about to 
any significant extent (see Heller et al., 1979). 
There was a clear désire in a national random household sample 
(recently carried out by my colleagues and myself) for greater involvement 
in each of three major decision-areas, particularly working conditions (see 
Heller, et al., 1979: 26). Although there was a good proportion of 
respondents not wanting involvement in capital investment décisions (53%), 
only 10% of ail replying did not want to be involved in décisions concerning 
work conditions (see Table 1). Shop-floor respondents accounted for 60% 
of the respondents; half were members of a trade union. 
TABLE 1 







Actual Desired Actual Desired Actual Desired 
% <7o <7o % <Fo % 
No involvement 25 10 41 21 77 53 
Some involvement 52 52 41 48 15 31 
'Power' involvement 23 38 18 32 9 16 
(<7o base) (1,667) (1,592) (1,483) (1,399) (1,606) (1,468) 
•within the plant 
As far as any érosion of managerial prérogative is concerned, this has 
been by custom and practice for the most part. It is only recently that, for 
example, the engineering unions obtained a "status quo" provision in their 
National Agreement, indeed as late as 1976. As there is no gênerai Labour 
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Code in Britain, this is not generalizable across the board, and is therefore 
restricted to the very spécifie sectors of industry. In practice, there is a great 
deal of joint régulation by collective bargaining. Moreover, the degree of 
joint régulation will perhaps dépend on the strength of organized labour in 
the labour market. Until recently, the reasonably high degree of full 
employment probably extended this intensity of joint régulation, as well as 
its scope; however, the récent tightening of the labour market, with increas-
ing unemployment, is likely to hait its extension. As far as légal re-
quirements are concerned, national coverage occurs less often, for example 
in such areas as health and safety. 
Over much of the last few décades of 'macro-corporatism', it looked as 
if the Labour Government at least over the period would not only ensure 
full employment, but would also lead to législative safeguards with respect 
to workers' rights. Indeed, apart from the Conservative interregnum of 
1970-1974, there was a considérable extension of such rights (see Hawkins, 
1978; Clegg, 1979). Moreover, it looked as if given the sympathetic climate 
towards the setting up of formai industrial democracy schemes and 
specifically the proposais of the Bullock Committee Majority Report 
(1977), there might be a clear advance in the area of worker involvement in 
decision-making, not only at the shop-floor level, but also with respect to 
plant-level, and indeed enterprise-wide decision-making (see T.U.C., 1974). 
Whether or not this would merely formalize at least the existing shop-floor 
level practices is another question. The hope was that the de jure, statutory 
extension of worker-influence in decision-making, at whatever level, would 
be more readily realizable and enforcable nationwide than the de facto 
development of spécifie areas of joint decision-making, be it joint régula-
tion of status quo matters or something more ambitious for the future in the 
form of workers' control (cf. Poole, 1978: 8-9). 
It is perfectly true that over the post-war period, and particularly the 
1970s, advances had been made albeit at the informai level, but not always 
necessarily limited to the following areas. Thèse include the introduction of 
new technology; the re-structuring of production; the organization of work 
itself ; the organization of working hours; the protection of the working en-
vironment; rewards Systems and économie participation; and last, staff 
policy. 
At this stage, we must point out that there are four logical possibilities 
where an extension of workers' influence could occur in each of thèse areas. 
In the first, if it is originally at the initiative of the workers themselves, or 
their représentatives. In the second, if it is encouraged from the manage-
ment side. In the third, if it is urged by both sides. And in the fourth, if it is 
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encouraged by neither side, but by an outside party (such as the State). We 
are not making any distinction hère between informai and formai, although 
it is likely that at least at the early stages such changes may hâve corne about 
more by custom and practice. 
As we hâve seen from our initial look at the gênerai nature of the 
British System of industrial relations, the likelihood of any major légal in-
itiative in thèse areas would not look very likely, at least a priori. However, 
as we shall shortly see, there has in fact been a légal impetus with respect to 
a number of thèse issues, particularly for example Health and Safety at 
Work législation (1974), which came into force in 1978 (as far as the 
organization of the working environment is concerned), although at the 
time of writing, most small firms hâve not appointed safety représentatives. 
It is even the case, with respect to dismissals and redundancies, that the 
Employment Protection Act of 1975 would be relevant (as far as the re-
structuring of production, or at least an aspect of it, might be concerned, or 
as far as staff rights are involved). It is true to say that the law may affect 
some aspects of thèse decision-areas to some degree (see Heller et al., 1979: 
82-98), but this will only be rather minimal in most cases except the spécifie 
ones we hâve cited (see Table 2). 
A further distinction has to be made where any changes in the areas 
described above hâve been initiated as a resuit of overseas models. In most 
cases, however, the changes hâve been indigenously generated, although it 
is worth noting that there hâve been a number of thèse which hâve been 
managerially initiated for the most part as a resuit of developments which 
hâve occurred in the United States on the one hand, or Scandinavia on the 
other. The Quality of Working Life (QWL) movement is now an interna-
tional network. Flexible hours corne to mind in the former case; and 
autonomous work groups; and so on, as far as the latter is concerned. There 
hâve also been quite a number of British experiments in say, job design 
(Klein, 1976; I.L.O., 1979a and 1979b). Continental European examples 
hâve played some part, particularly as far as the German laws on co-
determination, and the gênerai impetus towards harmonization as set out in 
the Fifth Directive of the Commission of the European Communities are 
concerned (see IDE, 1981a). 
It is also worth pointing out that the workers' représentatives who hâve 
been involved in many of thèse décision areas are not (at least in the British 
System) necessarily part of the formai union machinery (see Clegg, 1979), 
although senior management hâve taken the initiative in récent years to 
strengthen worker influence by ratifying closed-shop agreements. Even 
under a Conservative Government the picture has hardly changed in this 
respect. 


















(g) Staff policy 
De jure employée influence Degree 
No spécifie law as such, but Employment Protection 
(Consolidation) Act, 1980 may be invoked, with respect 
to dismissals and redundancies. It dépends on the conse- l o w 
quences of the introduction of new machinery (see b, c, 
and d). 
As above. If conséquences resuit in no implications for 
workers, except transfer of jobs, limited légal involve- low 
ment. If redundancies etc. follow, several laws are rele-
vant. 
No spécifie law as such, but see a, b, f and g. low 
Women, Young Persons & Children Act, 1920. 
Hours of Employment (Conventions) Act, 1936. 
Factories Act, 1961. low 
Equal Pay Act, 1970. 
Sex Discrimination Act, 1975. 
Health & Safety at Work Act, 1974. 
Also, Factories Acts since 1875, especially 1961. médium 
Offices, Shops & Railway Premises Act, 1963. 
No spécifie law as such, but profit-sharing may be very low 
affected by Finance Act, 1978. 
Employment Protection (Consolidation) Act, 1980, 
may be invoked. Disabled Persons Act, 1944/88. Race 
Relations Act, 1968/76. médium 
Equal Pay Act, 1970. 
Sex Discrimination Act, 1975. 
Contracts of Employment Act, 1963. 
See also AIKEN, 1975; HELLER et al., 1975: 82 ff.; GUERRIER, 1976, amongst other 
sources. 
The rôle of the shop stewards in Britain has been extensively described 
and it is not untrue to say that they are often in the front-line as far as the 
extension of worker influence is concerned in the areas which hâve been set 
out above. Since 1972, half the manufacturing plants with over 50 
employées hâve taken steps to formalize the position of their shop stewards. 
The degree of direct worker influence may however be guided by certain 
spécifie laws (or if not, officiai codes of practice) on at least some issues. 
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This may be true for example as far as redundancies and dismissals are con-
cerned (as far as the re-structuring of production or the introduction of new 
technology is concerned). However, it is likely, to hâve resulted from a 
managerial initiative with, for example, flexible working hours (as far as the 
organization of working hours is concerned); in the case of the re-
structuring of tasks (as far as the organization of work is concerned), 
although thèse will often be negotiated with unions via the workers' 
représentatives, whether formai or informai, and therefore subject to joint 
régulation. It has proved extremely difficult to introduce any change in any 
of thèse décision areas outside the ambit of joint régulation, except in in-
dustries where unionization is very low (it is around 55% on average) or in 
white-collar contexts where fewer workers are organized. Since the reces-
sion, managerial power has, however, been enhanced. In the 1970s, the 
gênerai trend was towards the extension of worker-influence in the areas 
above; however in a new décade, is the tide now turning? 
SURVEY EVIDENCE 
The empirical évidence from field investigations (see most recently, 
Heller et al., 1979; IDE, 1979) seems to suggest only a modest level of actual 
involvement either directly or indirectly in Britain. Other évidence adds to 
the picture. The Industrial Relations Research Unit at Warwick University, 
for example, found that in récent years employers hâve often taken the in-
itiative to bring senior managers and shop stewards together on joint con-
sultation committees. In a third of thèse cases, the worker représentatives 
were exclusively appointed by union channels. A Department of Employ-
aient study (Knight, 1979) found that three-quarters of the companies 
studied had J.C.C.s somewhere in the firm, but only half at company-wide 
level. Joint decision-making was prévalent on wage issues, but not changes 
in working practices. The total amount of involvement according to our 
own study (Heller et al., 1979: 20) was "astonishingly low", however, and 
trust between people showed a marked décline over the last décade (Heller 
et al., 1979: 48-49). 
Has joint consultation thus taken on a new lease of life (Knight, 1979; 
Hawes & Brookes, 1980, for example)? This may hâve occurred in a number 
of ways. Consultative company-wide councils, for instance, emerged as an 
important development in the seventies (among other things) to deal with 
closures and redundancies. Consultation often increases in downturns ac-
cording to one view (see Ramsey, 1977). Experiments took place in larger 
firms facing pressure on profits. Their délibérations went beyond the tradi-
tional joint consultation model. The CBI, the employers' fédération, 
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reported in 1977 that a survey of their members shows that the majority of 
big firms had given the right to information and consultation, with 16% of 
companies with more than 1,000 employées having participation 
agreements (see Clegg, 1979: 156; also Dobbins & Pettman, 1979: 22-28). 
There can be some doubts about this view in so far as since unemploy-
ment has grown drastically, managerial reactions hâve been increasingly 
unilatéral: whether this will be a long-term trend, is difficult to say, or 
whether attitudes are hardening on both sides. 
There appears to be no clear évidence that the désire for revolutionary, 
rather than reformist, changes in the workplace finds widespread support 
(cf. Pelling, 1969; Halsey, 1972; for the historical background). Only a very 
small minority (5%) of a sample interviewed in Autumn 1978 believed 
British society "must be radically changed by revolutionary action" {Euro-
baromètre, 1979). The so-called "affluent worker" (see Goldthorpe et al., 
1969) may want 'pie' in the pay-packet, not 'in the sky'; or so it is believed. 
Given the nature of the industrial relations System (past, présent and 
even future) then, it may not be possible to view participation as indepen-
dent of a wider set of variables which many writers hâve placed at the heart 
of their explanations of how the System works. However, how far it can be 
regarded as the central independent variable (see IDE, 1976; 1979; 1981 (a) 
and (b)) is another question. It may, for example, be seen as a contextual 
variable, subsumed under the 'historical' inputs to any model of advanced 
societies (see Shonfield, 1965; Giddens, 1973). 
Some hâve argued that it is the power of organized labour in collective 
bargaining that has led to its incorporation in managerial decision-making. 
Trade unions in Britain hâve tended for a long time to see the process of col-
laborative decision-making as one of bargaining, at most levels. Thus, it 
could be construed that what is occurring in Britain is "merely a reconstruc-
tion of collective bargaining at new levels, although to do so would take the 
term beyond its presently accepted meaning" (italics added). Indeed, im-
portant developments are happening at the plant and company levels, "and 
that country's industrial relations problems cannot be resolved except by 
giving major attention to those levels and to the mode of collective bargain-
ing" (Thomson, 1979: 53-54; see also Brown & Terry, 1978). 
It is difficult to precisely quantify the relationship between those areas 
of worker-influence gained by on the one hand statutory means, as opposed 
on the other hand to collective bargaining. We hâve seen the comparatively 
limited extent of de jure participation in the British System of industrial 
relations, vis-à-vis de facto reality over spécifie issues. 
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The country thus appears to rank very low in any listing of as many as 
12 European countries for either formalization of participation at the 
workers' level (rank =11) , and intensif y o/de jure workers' level participa-
tion (rank = 11) as reported in a récent study (see IDE, 1979: 279-280). Bri-
tain seemed there to belong to a low profile pattern which was indicated "by 
relatively low scores for ail groups with only minor peaks for top manage-
ment and représentative bodies. No one group tends to be favored by ex-
isting rules" (1979: 279). Yugoslavia topped the list for de jure workers' 
level participation, followed by Finland, Norway and West Germany. 
The ranking for de facto participation was, by contrast, less depressed 
in the same study. Britain appears there as ranking sixth for worker in-
fluence over 16 décisions, and seventh for représentative bodies (IDE, 1979: 
281). For actual involvement, over the same range of décisions, Britain 
ranked joint second (with the Netherlands), with only Yugoslavia topping 
their score (IDE, 1979: 288). 
RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Could anything be done to help formai statutory provision for par-
ticipation in the British System? A White Paper on industrial democracy 
presented to Parliament in the late Spring of 1978, the most récent statutory 
proposai, fared badly in the législative queue. The Government at the time 
had already reached an impasse with both the CBI and the TUC, in any 
case. The White Paper suggested graduai progress towards a worker-
director System and clearly defined statutory rights on employée consulta-
tion and disclosure of company information. This did not please either the 
employers or the unions. Help was also to be given to not only producer-
cooperatives, but also to employée profit-sharing schemes — largely due to 
the influence of the 'Lib-Lab' pact. The pressure for progress towards in-
dustrial democracy in the nationalized sector was to continue, and the 
White Paper amplified this. The Post Office adopted a worker-director 
scheme (but has later dropped it). However, the momentum towards a 
Bullock-type solution has now generally declined, even though an evolu-
tionary view (see Elliot, 1978, for example) prevailed. The probability of 
steps towards a statutory institutionalization of industrial democracy under 
the présent Conservative Government appears to be rather low (see Warner, 
1981). 
During the years since the Bullock Report was published, it is true that 
debate about worker participation has become less vocal. It can now be said 
to be a low-key issue. At the lop level, it may be argued, worker participa-
tion is not for the most part seen as a panacea to the issues of inflation, low 
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growth, balance of payments, unemployment and so on. At the micro-level, 
it is similarly not seen as relevant to immédiate increases in wage rates and 
salary levels, manning levels or redundancies, profitability or investment. 
Industrial and occupational earnings differentials appear to hâve become 
again pre-occupations. Strikes also spectacularly increased over the 1980 
period, but then moderated. Away from the main issues, the long-term 
necessity for re-structuring British industry, avoiding de-industrialization 
and self-sufficiency in energy over the médium term seem to be priority pro-
blems. Serious discussions of thèse issues has not yet adequately taken ac-
count of the rôle worker participation might play hère in their resolution. 
The overall impression of British industrial relations however appears 
to be one of relative if deceptive stability, with union membership stable 
even marginally declining due to unemployment; managers, wonien and 
white collar workers wanting to take part in traditional collective bargaining 
as established in the public sector and amongst the strongly unionized blue 
collar, private sector. There are few apparent reasons to think that likely 
changes in government or union leadership or shop-floor activity will 
drastically alter this state of affairs over the next few years. Under the pré-
sent Conservative Government, unions are likely to become more protec-
tionist if présent unemployment levels persist or increase. Ail this means 
hanging on to what you hâve, not trying to alter the basis of légitimation or 
the extent of participation. 
This sectionalist conjecture is supported by an acute appraisal of the 
post-war scène, noting that: "The market continued to be the regulator of 
both political and industrial relations until the mid-sixties. Since then, 
économie stagnation and inflation hâve, together, created a new situation 
which we can describe as the spread of politics into the economy. Unions 
hâve become more militant, and hâve extended their organizations far 
beyond the industrial prolétariat. The state has become less parliamentary 
and more the centre of attempts to incorporate and pacify competing 
économie interests — ail of whom are récalcitrant corporatists. And localiz-
ed conflict is rife. The old struggles hâve shifted back to the workplace and 
the locality where they began, and where horizons are narrowest and objec-
tives most sectional". (Halsey, 1978: 147.) 
This conclusion, however, may be balanced on the other hand by the 
view: "Industrial democracy has been described as a process of building a 
social base for democracy. The argument of having no alliance with capital 
hinges on the belief that any contract thus forged will hâve an inbuilt bias. 
But for a strong trade union movement to turn away from industrial 
democracy despite the treacherous risks is to shun a crucial additional 
weapon in the struggle to hâve that contract fairly drafted". (Wintour, 
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1977: 5.) The 1978 White Paper represented a step in the direction of such 
evolutionary change, but it was faced with a great deal of intertia to over-
come. 
Another survey (Parsloe, 1980) suggests that worker participation and 
works councils had almost dropped from sight as strong potential areas of 
conflict, at least in the view of industrial relations specialists (N = 150). The 
future flashpoints for 1980 seemed to be "bread and butter économie 
issues'' (Parsloe, 1980: 17). On a four-point scale, wage and salary increases 
came top (3.5), shorter hours next (2.9), restoration of differentials (2.8) 
jointly with manning-levels. Scoring last, were setting up Health and Safety 
Committees (1.2), worker participation (1.1) and last, forming works-
councils (0.8). 
Informed opinion may, however, help to keep interest alive in what one 
editorial writer dubbed "a wider agenda than strict control of the money 
supply" (Guardian, May 19, 1980). Indeed, both Labour and Libéral Par-
ties hâve endorsed the ethical case for more workers' involvement: "Scep-
tics about industrial democracy argue that there is no proven demand from 
the workers themselves for a greater control over décisions, and opinion 
poil findings reinforce the view. That is a powerful argument against the im-
position of industrial democracy by government, but it is no argument 
against its encouragement. The lack of demand for workers' participation is 
probably more apparent than real. Since the end of the sixties, there seems 
to hâve been increasing complaint from employées about poor and inflexi-
ble working conditions and lack of job satisfaction. Yet in the same period 
there has been a pronounced increase in militancy over wages — even 
though we are more affluent than at any time in our history. Paradoxically, 
the lack of job satisfaction may hâve spurred wage militancy, and may con-
tinue to do so unless alternative channels are created." 
It can be argued that the proper choice for this Government is to en-
courage a wide range of experiments: "Further tax concessions, publicity 
and information about best practices would ail help to renew interest. The 
gathering recession has unfortunately provided a convenient excuse (not on-
ly in Britain) for governments to soft pedal industrial democracy. But that 
excuse looks threadbare when reform might provide part of the solution to 
the intractable problems of our industrial relations." The appeal of the pro-
jected Centre party to public opinion is partly built upon a belief it would 
give workers more say in running their firms, in fact the second most impor-
tant policy attracting support (Observer, February 1, 1981). 
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Conclusing Remarks 
This paper has tried to look at developments in the area of workplace 
participation as they hâve developed in relation to parallel corporatist 
trends. While the British expérience has led to several strands of de facto in-
dustrial democracy emerging, there has been no statutory institutionaliza-
tion thus far. This is not to say that the law has been absent from UK in-
dustrial relations, but no clear, straightforward mirror-image of cor-
poratism has yet developed at the micro-level. Thus some form of micro-
corporatism may be emerging in a de facto manner, but there are no légal 
structures to buttress it as exists in other parts of the European Community. 
We hâve as yet no cohérent empirical theory of corporatism available, but 
even so such a theory must ultimately take into account developments in the 
workplace. The theory will hâve to link both micro- and macro- corporatist 
trends and structures; but the major problem to overcome is that scénarios 
in Britain do not unfold in very neat patterns. There is a political 'stop-go' 
cycle which affects both micro- as well as macro-corporatist developments, 
such as attempts to impose some form of incomes policy and/or productivi-
ty bargaining schemes, or encourage this or that type of industrial 
democracy, and we should also take into account which political party is in 
office for to prétend this does not count is rather misleading. So, the pro-
blem is not only one of systematization, but also synchronization. This is 
confounded by changes in économie policy which affect the state of the 
labour market, for when it is 'tight' attempts at both de jure and de facto 
worker-influence hâve a better chance of succeeding. Clearly then, as far as 
the next straws in the wind are concerned, we shall hâve to wait and see. 
Any conclusions for policy-making must, of course, remain tentative. 
There are strong arguments for building on existing institutions and prac-
tices. It will not be easy to 'import' solutions. Before moving towards ex-
perimenting with workers on boards, it seems sensible to consolidate and 
extend the rôle of collective bargaining bodies, such as JCCs; to reinforce 
and expand the powers of Health and Safety Committees; and further 
specify policies relating to areas such as the introduction of new technology, 
for example. Ail thèse developments may need stronger statutory backing. 
It will, no doubt, take some time for the de jure position to catch up 
with de facto reality, although as we hâve tried to show, the variance (and 
even ambiguity) on each of thèse is sufficient to generate misleading impres-
sions regarding the degree of worker-participation in the United Kingdom. 
It is certainly possible to further clarify the de jure position vis-à-vis har-
monization with Britain's partners in the Community by législative action. 
What better place to start with than workplace participation? The deter-
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mination of working conditions is one area where a clear research consensus 
can be found regarding the évidence of a strong désire for greater worker in-
fluence and involvement (see Hespe & Wall, 1976; Heller et al., 1979, etc.). 
It can be argued that by adopting a lowest common-denominator 
strategy, policy-makers will hâve a greater chance of success than previous 
attempts at harmonization. There is little to lose by such an approach, and 
it may provide a consolidation of both the existing de jure and de facto posi-
tions, and possibly their intégration. Later, such an attempt at harmoniza-
tion can be extended into wider decision-making areas, whatever shape such 
micro-corporatist developments take. 
Thus, the quest for a new 'fraternal' framework within which in-
dustrial relations can be conducted must continue. As Halsey has recently 
concluded: 
"A heroic âge of universalist political controversy has ended. 
Freedom, the truly precious inheritance, is preserved. Equality has been 
displaced by a political search for économie growth: and the problem of 
fraternity is still with us ." (Hasley, 1978: 147.) 
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Corporatisme, participation et société 
Cet article traite des changements qui peuvent se produire en Angleterre dans le 
domaine de la participation des travailleurs à la vie des entreprises parallèlement à la 
croissance des tendances corporatistes qui se répandent en Europe continentale. 
Alors que l'expérience britannique a conduit à plusieurs réalisations favorables 
à la démocratie industrielle, il n'y a guère eu émergence d'institutions proprement 
dites qui se soient implantées. Ceci ne signifie pas que la loi ait été absente du do-
maine des relations professionnelles en Grande-Bretagne, mais aucune orientation 
claire vers l'établissement d'un régime corporatiste ne s'est dessinée. Si l'on peut 
noter que certaines formes de corporatisme sont apparues dans les faits au niveau des 
entreprises, il n'existe pas de structures juridiques pour les étayer comme on en 
trouve dans les pays de la Communauté économique européenne en général. 
Nous ne disposons pas de théorie empirique en matière de corporatisme, mais 
nous croyons qu'une pareille théorie, si elle devait exister, devrait tenir compte de ce 
qui se passe en milieu de travail. La théorie devrait encore faire le lien entre les ten-
dances micro et macro-corporatistes, et le principal problème à surmonter sur ce 
point en Grande-Bretagne, c'est que les scénarios ne se présentent pas sous la forme 
de modèles bien ordonnés. On y observe un cycle «marche-arrêt» qui est de nature à 
influencer aussi bien les développements micro-corporatistes que macro-corpora-
tistes, par exemple, des tentatives en vue d'imposer certaines formes de politique des 
revenus ou de productivité, des plans de négociation, différents types de démocratie 
industrielle. De plus, il faut encore tenir compte du parti politique qui détient le 
pouvoir. Il ne s'agit pas uniquement d'une question de systématisation, mais encore 
de synchronisation. Enfin, les changements dans l'orientation de la politique écono-
mique qui exerce une influence sur l'état du marché du travail bouleversent les don-
nées. En effet, lorsque la demande est forte sur les marchés, il est compréhensible 
que l'influence des travailleurs grandisse. 
Par conséquent, mieux vaut-il demeurer dans un état d'expectative. Toutes les 
conclusions relatives à la formulation de politiques générales restent d'ordre expéri-
mental. Il y a de forts arguments qui militent en faveur des institutions et des prati-
ques actuelles. Aussi, il ne sera pas facile d'imposer des solutions importées d'ail-
leurs. Par exemple, avant de faire l'expérience de la participation des travailleurs aux 
décisions des conseils d'administration, il semble qu'il soit nécessaire de consolider et 
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d'accroître le rôle des organismes de négociation, de renforcer et de généraliser les 
pouvoirs de comités de santé et de sécurité au travail, de mettre au point les politi-
ques à établir dans certains domaines comme l'introduction de nouvelles technolo-
gies dans les entreprises, tous développements qui peuvent nécessiter le support 
d'une législation. 
Il faudra sans doute quelque temps encore avant que l'état de droit rattrape la 
réalité des faits, même s'il est possible par l'action législative d'établir un équilibre 
entre ce qui existe en Angleterre et dans les autres pays de la Communauté économi-
que européenne. 
Pourquoi ne pas commencer par l'établissement d'une certaine participation des 
travailleurs en milieu de travail? La détermination des conditions de travail est un 
domaine où l'on peut en arriver à un consensus en matière d'influence et d'engage-
ment de la part des salariés. 
Il est plausible que, par la recherche du plus bas commun dénominateur, les 
hommes politiques aient plus de chance de succès. Il n'y a rien à perdre si l'on tente 
une semblable formule qui peut aider à rapprocher l'état de droit de la réalité des 
faits, quitte à en arriver plus tard à une harmonisation complète. 
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